DEGG vs. MIDLAND RAILWAY COMPANY.

Miller vs. Thompson, 1 Wendell's Rep. 447, and the numerous other cases, English and American, relied upon by the counsel
for the plaintiff in error; and hold, that the present action may be
maintained by the mother, although by reason of the fact, that the
father was living at the time of the seduction, and the seduced was
at the time a member of his family, and rendering service to him,
the mother was not then, nor could she be, in law, entitled to the
services of the daughter : but the latter having remained with the
mother, after the father's death, in the presumed relation of servant,
and the trouble and expenses of lying-in having fallen upon her,
the action is maintainable on this ground.
Judgment affirmed.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISION.

In the Court of _Ezchequer.-Sittings in bane after Hfilary Term,
.February21, 1857.
DEGG, ADINISTRATRIX VS. THE MIDLAND RAILWAY COMPANY."

A personwho came voluntarily to assist the servants of a railway company, doing
some work on the railway, was accidentally killed by the negligence of some other
servants of the company. The railway company not having authorized the negligence, andthe servantsbeing persons of ordinary skill and care for the work,Held,
irst, that no action lay against the company by the personel representative of
the deceased under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 ;2 and,
Secosdly, that the above facts constituted a defence under the plea of not guilty.

This was an action brought under the 9 and 10 Yict. c. 98, by. the
tdministratrix of one Degg, to recover damages for the death of the
deceased. The declaration alleged that the defendants were possessed of a certain railway, and engines and carriages upon it, and
by their servants were at work on the railway with those carriages
and engines, and carelessly, negligently and improperly moved and
propelled certain trucks against other trucks, without due notice or
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2 This statute has been substantially re-enacted in many of the States.
Tidd's Pract. 9 note, Am. edition.-Ed8. Am. L. Rey.
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precaution, in consequence whereof, and of the carelessness, negligence and unskillfulness of the defendants by their servants, the
deceased was killed, &c. To this declaration the defendants pleaded
first, not guilty; and secondly, a special plea, to the effect that at
the time of the accident the deceased was voluntarily assisting some
of the servants of the defendants in their work on the railway; that
the servants of the defendants were persons of ordinary skill and
care for the work on which they were employed; and that the act
in question was done and the injury inflicted without the authority
of the defendants. To this plea the plaintiff demurred; and issue
having been joined on both pleas, the cause was tried before Alderson, B., when it appeared that the deceased met his death in the
manner stated in the pleadings; namely, some servants of the defendants being engaged in moving trucks along the railway, the
deceased volunteered to assist them, and in so doing was accidentally killed by a truck which had been set in motion by some other
servants of the defendants. On this evidence the judge told the
jury that the defendants were bound to appoint persons of ordinary
skill and care to work on their railway, and if the servants whose
conduct caused the accident were not such, their verdict ought to
be for the plaintiff. If, however, those servants were persons of
ordinary skill and care, although they might have been guilty of
negligence in the particular act which caused the death of the deceased, the defendants would be entitled to their verdict. The jury
found for the plaintiff on the general issue, and for the defendants
on the special plea ; the judge reserving leave to enter a verdict for
the defendants on the first issue, if the court should on demurrer
hold the special plea good, and that the finding on the issue raised
by it necessarily amounted to a finding for the defendants on the
general issue.
Keating, in Michaelmas Term, having obtained a rule accordingly,
the demurrer and the rule were argued in the Michaelmas Term,
(Nov. 22), and again in Hilary Term, (Jan. 14), before Pollock, C.
D., Martin, Bramwell, and Watson, BB., by
Pigott, Serjt. for the plaintiff; and
HEeating and -Phlmon,for the defendants.
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The arguments fully appear in the judgment; and the following
authorities were referred to :-Bro7c vs. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203 ;
llott vs. Wilkes, 3 B. & Al. 804 ; -Birdvs. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628 ;
Priestly vs. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1; Davies vs. Mann, 10 M. & W.
546; Lynch vs. Nurdin, I Q. B. 29; Barnes vs. Ward, 19 L. J.,
C. P. 195; Rigby vs. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240; Greenlandvs. Chaplin, Id. 243; lutchinson vs. The York, Newcastle and Berwick
Bailway Company, Id. 343; TJigmore vs. Jay, Id. 854; Wiggett
vs. Fox, 11 Exch. 882; The Manchester Railway Company vs.
Wallis, 23 L. J., C. P. 85; Lygo vs. Newbold, Id. Ex. 108 ; Tarrant vs. W7ebb, 18 C. B. 797 ; Southeote vs. Stanley, 15 L. J. Ex.
'39; Paterson vs. Wallace, 1 Macq. 748; and Reg. Gen., T. T.,
1853, (Pleading,) r. 16.
Cur. adv. vult.
The judgment of the court was now ddlivered by
BrAMWELL, B.-In this case there were two questions for our
determination-the first, whether the plea demurred to was good;
the second, whether the verdict found for the plaintiff on the general
issue should stand, or be entered for the defendants. We reserved
our judgment not from any doubt on the merits of the dispute
between the parties, but from a difficulty as to the point of pleading
raised by the second question.
The facts stated by the declaration and the plea demurred to may
be thus summed up :-The defendants were possessed of arailway and
carriages and engines; their servants were at work on the railway
in'their service, with those carriages and engines ; the deceased
voluntarily assisted some of them in their work; others of the dedefendants' servants were negligent about their work, and by reason thereof the deceased was killed; the defendants' servants were
persons competent to do the work ; the defendants did not authorize
the negligence.
We are of opinion that under these circumstances the action is
not maintainable. The cases show that if the deceased had been a
servant of the defendants, and injured under such circumstances as
occurred here no action would be maintainable; and it might be
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enough for us to say that those cases govern this, for it seems impossible to suppose that the deceased, by volunteering his services
can have any greater rights, or impose any greater duty on the defendants, than would have existed had he been a hired servant.
But we were pressed by an expression, to be found in those cases,
to the effect, that "a servant undertakes, as l etween him and the master to, run all the ordinary risks of the service, including the negligence of a fellow servant :" TWigget vs. Fox, 11 Exch. 832, and it
was said there was no such undertaking here. But in truth there
is as much in the one case as in the other; the consideration may
not be as obvious, but it is as competent for. a man to agree, and as
reasonable to hold that he does agree, that if allowed to assist in
the work, though not paid, he will take care of himself, from the
negligence of his fellow workman, as it would be if he were paid for
his services.
But we were also told that there was and could be no agreement;
that Degg was a wrongdoer, and therefore the action was maintainable. It certainly would be strange that the case should be better
if he were a wrongdoer than if he had not been. We are of opinion
that this argument cannot be supported. We desire not to be
understood as laying down any general proposition, that a wrongdoer never can maintain an action. If a man-commits a trespass
to land, the occupier is not justified in shooting him; and probably
if the occupier were sporting or firing at a mark on his land, and
saw a trespasser, and fired carelessly.and hurt him, au action would
lie. Nor do we desire to give any opinion on the cases cited of Bird
vs. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, and LIjnch vs. 7Vurdin, 1 Q. B. 29;
but it is obvious and a truism to say that a wrongdoer cannot, any
more than one who is not a wrongdoer, maintain an action, unless
lie has a right to complain of the act causing the injury, and complain thereof against the person he has made defendant in the action. Now, it may be, that had the mischief here resulted from the
personal act of the master, he knowing that the deceased was there,
the master would have been liable; and that as the defendants' servants
knew the deceased was on the railway, and because they knew that,
were guilty of a wrong to him, they are liable to an action ; but on
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what reason or principle should the defendants be ? If a servant is
driving his master in a carriage, and a person gets up behind, and
the servant knowing it, drives carelessly and injures that person,
the servant may be liable, but why the master? The law, for reasons of supposed convenience more than on principle, makes a
master liable in certain.cases for the acts of his servants-not only
in cases in the nature of contract, which depend on different considerations, but in cases independent of contract, such as negligent driving
in the public streets, when damage is thereby done. -This is the responsibility the law has put on them; there is a duty on them to take
care that their servants do no damage to others by negligence in their
work for their master, or to compensate the sufferer where such
damage is done. The public interest may require this for the public benefit; but why should a wrongdoer have power to create such
a responsibility and such a duty ? No reason can be assigned.
Some acts are absolutely and intrinsically wrong, where they
directly and necessarily do an injury, as a blow; others only so from
their probable consequences. There is no absolute or intrinsic negligence ; it is always relative to some circumstances of time, place,
or person. It is not negligent or wrong for a man to fire at a mark
on his own grounds at a distance from others, or to ride very rapidly
in -his own park ; but it is wrong so to fire near to, and so to ride
on the public highway; and though the quality of the act is not
altered, it is wrong in whoever does it, and so far it is as though it
were intrinsically wrong. So the act of firing or riding fast in an
enclosure becomes wrong if the person doing it sees there is some
one near whom it may damage. But the act is wrong in him only
for the personal reason that he knows of its danger ; it would not be
wrong in any one else who did not know that. Now for a willful
act intrinsically wrong by a servant, the master is not liable. By
a parity of reason, he ought not to be where the act, not wrong in
itself, is only so for reasons personal to the servant, and his willful
disregard of them. The master's liability ought be limited to that
which he may anticipate and guard against, namely, the middle
class of cases we have put. However this may be, it seems to us
there can be no action except in respect of a duty infringed, and
that no man by his wrongful act can impose a duty ; and as a direc-

